This paper analyzes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems that generalizes the socalled reverse Talmud rule and encompasses both the constrained equal-awards rule and the constrained equal-losses rule. The family, introduced by van den Brink et al., [Characterization of the reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by exemption and exclusion properties, European Journal of Operational Research 228 (2013), 413-417], is a counterpart to the so-called TAL-family of rules, introduced and studied by Moreno-Ternero and Villar [The TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems, Social Choice and Welfare 27 (2006) 231-249], and it is included within the so-called CIC-family of rules introduced by Thomson [Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims, Social Choice and Welfare 31 (2008) 667-692]. We provide a systematic study of the structural properties of the rules within the family, as well as its connections with the existing related literature. JEL numbers: D63.
Introduction
The problem of adjudicating conflicting claims refers to a situation in which one has to distribute a good whose available amount is not enough to cover all agents' demands on it. This is a classic allocation problem, which encompasses many different situations, like the bankruptcy of a firm (our running interpretation throughout this paper; hence its title), or the collection of a given amount of taxes. The reader is referred to Thomson (2003 Thomson ( , 2015a Thomson ( , 2017 for extensive reviews and surveys of the sizable literature dealing with this problem, which originated in O'Neill (1982) .
A classical rule to solve problems of adjudicating conflicting claims is the so-called Talmud rule (e.g., Aumann and Maschler, 1985) , which applies equal division until the claimant with the smallest claim has obtained one half of her claim. Then, that agent stops receiving additional units and the remaining amount is divided equally among the other agents until the claimant with the second smallest claim gets one half of her claim. The process continues until every agent has received one half of her claim, or the available amount is distributed. If there is still something left after this process, agents are invited back to receive additional shares. Now agents receive additional amounts sequentially starting with those with larger claims and applying equal division of their losses.
One natural way of generalizing the Talmud rule would be obtained by moving the threshold in the above definition from one half to any other possible fraction (of the aggregate and individual incomes). In doing so, we would obtain a non-countable set of piece-wise linear rules ranging from the so-called constrained equal-awards rule to the so-called constrained equallosses rule (and having the Talmud rule in the middle). The resulting family of rules, known as the TAL-family, was introduced by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006a), who provided a systematic study of the structural properties of the rules within the family. 1 Thomson (2008) analyzes a more general family encompassing this one, known as the ICI-family, which require that the evolution of each claimant's award, as a function of the amount to divide, is increasing first, constant next and finally increasing again. 2 Moreno-Ternero (2011a) considers another generalization of the TAL-family in which the slope of the pieces might be different. 1 See also Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006b) and Moreno-Ternero (2007 , 2011b . 2 More recently, Huijink et al., (2015) have given an alternative definition of the rules in such a family, as claim-and-right rules, which give a specific interpretation to the concept of baselines formalized earlier by Hougaard et al., (2012 Hougaard et al., ( , 2013a Hougaard et al., ( , 2013b . See also Pulido et al., (2002 Pulido et al., ( , 2008 , Bergantiños and Lorenzo (2008) and
Timoner and Izquierdo (2016) for related notions.
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The Talmud rule has a natural counterpart rule in which the equal awards and equal losses principles are applied in the reverse order. More precisely, the so-called reverse Talmud rule (e.g., Chun et al., 2001) originates when, for each claims vector, we apply the equal losses principle in the lower half of the range of the endowment, and the equal awards principle in the upper half. As for the Talmud rule, half-claims are used instead of the claims themselves.
Therefore, the same natural idea considered above to generalize the Talmud rule could be considered to generalize the reverse Talmud rule, as recently suggested by van den Brink et al., (2013) . That process gives rise to a new family of rules, the reverse TAL-family, that will be the object of this study. Such a family also consists of a non-countable set of piece-wise linear rules, ranging from the constrained equal-awards rule to the constrained equal-losses rule, but this time having the reverse Talmud rule in the middle. The family is included within a more general family, known as the CIC-family also introduced by Thomson (2008) . All CIC-rules require that the evolution of each claimant's award, as a function of the amount to divide, is constant first, increasing next and finally constant again.
The aim of this paper is to present a systematic study of the structural properties of the rules within the reverse TAL-family, as well as its connections with the existing related literature.
In particular, we shall show the similarities and differences with respect to its counterpart TAL-family of rules. As we shall see, some of the results we obtain will be derived from the techniques developed in Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006a,b) and Thomson (2008) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the reference model and presents the reverse TAL-family. Section 3 analyzes the structural properties of the rules in this family.
Section 4 relates the family to other existing families in the literature. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are relegated to an appendix.
The model
We study bankruptcy problems in a variable-population model. The set of potential claimants, or agents, is identified with the set of natural numbers N. Let N be the class of finite subsets of N, with generic element N . Let n denote the cardinality of N . For each i ∈ N , let c i ∈ R + be i's claim and c ≡ (c i ) i∈N the claims profile. 3 A (bankruptcy) problem is a triple consisting of a population N ∈ N , a claims profile c ∈ R n + , and an endowment E ∈ R + such that i∈N c i ≥ E. Let C ≡ i∈N c i . To avoid unnecessary complication, we assume C > 0. Let D N be the domain
Duality relationship and parametric representation
We first convey a precise duality relationship between the members of the reverse TAL-family. 4 Proposition 1. For each θ ∈ [0, 1], the dual rule of RT θ is RT 1−θ .
Two well-known results are immediately derived from this duality relationship. One is that L and A are dual rules. Another is that RT is self-dual (in fact, there is no other self-dual rule in the reverse TAL-family).
As defined by Young (1987) , a rule is parametric if the ith agent's award is a function that only depends on c i and a parameter λ, which is related to the size of the amount to divide.
More precisely:
continuous and weakly monotonic in its first argument, such that:
(ii) f (a, x) = 0, for each x ∈ R + ; and
Analogously to what happens with the TAL-family (see Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006a), all rules within the reverse TAL-family are parametric. To check this, let θ ∈ [0, 1] be given and define f θ : R ∪ {±∞} × R + → R + as follows:
Clearly, f θ is continuous and weakly monotonic in its first argument, with lim λ→−∞ f θ (λ, c i ) = 0 and lim λ→+∞ f θ (λ, c i ) = c i for each c i ∈ R + . As a result, the Darboux property shows
, which shows that f θ is a parametric representation of RT θ . 
Basic properties
Therefore, the above allows us to show that all rules within the reverse TAL-family satisfy equal treatment of equals, continuity, and consistency. 5 As a matter of fact, the rules also satisfy two strengthenings of equal treatment of equals; namely, anonymity (any "renaming" of claimants should be accompanied by a parallel reassignment of awards) and order preservation (agents with larger claims receive larger awards but face larger losses too). They also satisfy the basic property of scale invariance (if claims and endowment are multiplied by the same positive number, then so should all awards).
Formally, a rule R is anonymous if for each (N, c, E) ∈ D, each permutation π ∈ Π N ,
Proposition 2. All rules within the reverse TAL-family satisfy anonymity, order preservation, continuity, scale invariance, and consistency.
Monotonicity properties
We now consider a set of monotonicity properties that are also satisfied by all members of the family. They are the following.
Resource monotonicity: if there is more to be divided, nobody should lose; Claims monotonicity: if an agent's claim increases, she should receive at least as much as she did initially;
Linked claim-resource monotonicity: if an agent's claim and the endowment increase by the 5 It is not difficult to show directly, nonetheless, that the rules within the family indeed satisfy the three properties. Formally, a rule R is resource monotonic if, for each (N, c, E) ∈ D and each E > E, with
Similar properties turned out to be very strong in other domains of problems, sometimes even being incompatible with very elementary requirements of efficiency and fairness (e.g., Thomson, 2013) . It turns out, however, that all rules within the reverse TAL-family satisfy these properties, which are reasonably weak in the context of bankruptcy problems.
Proposition 3. All rules within the reverse TAL-family satisfy resource monotonicity, claims monotonicity, linked claim-resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, linked resourcepopulation monotonicity, and resource-and-population uniformity
Independence properties
We now consider two dual independence properties, known as minimal rights first and claims truncation invariance. 7 The former postulates that the part of a claim that is above the amount
The latter ensures each agent the portion of the endowment that is left to her when the claims of all other agents are fully honored (provided this amount is nonnegative) and divides the remainder according to revised claims. 8 Formally,
The next result describes the behavior of the family with respect to these properties.
Proposition 4. The following statements hold:
(i) The only rule in the reverse TAL-family that satisfies claims truncation invariance is
(ii) The only rule in the reverse TAL-family that satisfies minimal rights first is RT 1 = L.
Proposition 4 shows an interesting difference between the reverse TAL-family and the TALfamily. Whereas there is only one rule in the reverse TAL-family that satisfies claims truncation invariance (the constrained equal-awards rule), all rules in the TAL-family with parameter θ ∈ [ 1 2 , 1] satisfy claims truncation invariance (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006a; Theorem 1). Similarly, there is only one rule in the reverse TAL-family that satisfies minimal rights first (the constrained equal-losses rule), while all rules in the TAL-family with parameter θ ∈ [0, 1 2 ] satisfy this axiom. Thus, within the TAL-family every rule satisfies at least one of these two axioms (with the Talmud rule being the only one that satisfies both), while in the reverse TAL-family, besides the constrained equal-awards and constrained equal-losses rule, none of the rules satisfies any of these two axioms. 7 We say that a property P * is the dual of property P if, for each rule R, it holds that R satisfies P if and only if R * satisfies P * . A property is self-dual if it coincides with its dual. 8 These two axioms were studied first by Curiel et al. (1987) .
Lower and upper bounds
Although lower bounds have long been used within the theory of fair allocation, they have only been recently explored for bankruptcy problems. A focal lower bound is the so-called average truncated lower bound on awards, which is somewhat related to the claims truncation invariance axiom considered above. It ensures each agent a minimal share of her individual claim, no matter what the other claims are. In particular, for a problem involving n agents, it establishes that any agent holding a feasible claim (a claim not larger than the amount to divide) will get at least one nth of her claim. And also that those agents whose individual claims are unfeasible will get at least one nth of the amount to divide. 9 Formally, a rule R satisfies while all rules in the TAL-family with parameter θ ∈ [0, 1 2 ] satisfy this axiom. Thus, within the TAL-family, every rule satisfies at least one of these two axioms (with the Talmud rule being the only one that satisfies both), while in the reverse TAL-family, besides the constrained equal-awards and constrained equal-losses rule, none of the rules satisfies any of these two axioms. 9 The property was introduced by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2004) under the name of securement.
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Composition properties
We now consider two additional properties dealing with the solvability of a bankruptcy problem in stages. To motivate these properties think of the following situation: after having divided the allocation of the available amount among its creditors, it turns out that the actual value of the amount is larger than was initially assumed. Then, two options are open: either the tentative division is cancelled altogether and the actual problem is solved, or we add to the initial distribution the result of applying the rule to the remaining amount, after claims are adjusted down. The requirement formulated next is that both ways of proceeding should result in the same awards vectors. Formally, a rule R satisfies composition up if, for each (N, c, E) ∈ D, and each pair
Think now of the dual case. Namely, after having divided the available amount among its creditors one finds that the actual value of the amount to divide falls short of what was assumed.
Here again we can ignore the initial division and apply the rule to the revised problem, or we 
Protective properties
We now turn our attention to a group of properties that appear in the literature referring to the application of some protective criteria for agents with "very large" or "very small" claims:
sustainability, independence of residual claims, exemption, and exclusion. 11 They establish restrictions on the behavior of a rule when claims are very unequal. Both exemption and sustainability require that agents with relatively small claims be fully reimbursed. According to the former property, smallness is defined as having a claim below equal division of the available amount. According to the latter property, a claim is considered small when substituting it for the claim of any other agent whose claim is higher, there would be enough to compensate everyone. Formally, a rule R satisfies sustainability if, for each (N, c, E) ∈ D, and each i ∈ N ,
Although they are equivalent in the twoclaimant case, sustainability implies exemption in the general case of n claimants (Herrero and Villar, 2002) . Conversely, if a rule satisfies exemption and consistency then it also satisfies sustainability (Yeh, 2006 ). Dually, one could adopt the viewpoint that agents with larger claims are given priority so that agents with very small claims should not receive anything. We say that a claim is Yet, there is no θ for which RT θ is the proportional rule (i.e., the proportional rule is not a member of the reverse TAL-family). 11 The notions of sustainability and independence of residual claims are referred as conditional full compensation and conditional null compensation, respectively, by Thomson (2003 The next result shows the behavior of the reverse TAL-family with respect to these protective properties.
Proposition 7. The following statements hold:
(i) The only rule in the reverse TAL-family that satisfies sustainability is RT 0 = A.
(ii) The only rule in the reverse TAL-family that satisfies exemption is RT 0 = A.
(iii) The only rule in the reverse TAL-family that satisfies independence of residual claims is RT 1 = L.
(iv) The only rule in the reverse TAL-family that satisfies exclusion is RT 1 = L.
The same result holds for the TAL-family, i.e., the constrained equal-awards rule is the only rule in the TAL-family satisfying sustainability (respectively, exemption) and the constrained equal-losses is the only rule in the TAL-family satisfying independence of residual claims (respectively, exclusion), as shown by Theorem 4 in Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006a).
Distributional effects
Finally, we consider the effect of changes in the parameter θ that generates the reverse TALfamily on the resulting distribution corresponding to a given problem. In order to do that, we compare the allocations generated by different rules in the family, for a given problem, by means of the classical Lorenz ordering. Given x, y ∈ R n satisfying x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ ... ≤ x n ,
.., n − 1, with at least one strict inequality. This criterion induces a partial ordering on allocations which reflects their relative spread. When x is greater than y in the Lorenz ordering, the distribution x is unambiguously "more egalitarian" than the distribution y.
We say that a rule R Lorenz dominates a rule R , which we write as R L R , when for each (N, c, E) ∈ D, R(N, c, E) is greater than R (N, c, E) in the Lorenz ordering. The following result is a corollary of a more general result proved by Thomson (2008) for the CIC family. Flores-Szwagrzak (2015) considers the sub-family of generalized equal-sacrifice rules consisting of those satisfying minimal rights first. 13 By the above, and Proposition 4, it follows that the intersection between such a family and the reverse TAL-family only consists of the constrained equal-losses rule. 14 Thomson (2015b) and Harless (2017) are also instances of recent proposals for families of rules. In both cases, the motivation is to compromise between the proportional rule and the constrained equal-awards rule (or the constrained equal-losses rules). 15 As the proportional rule is not a member of the reverse TAL-family, the compromises do not belong to the reverse TAL-family either.
From a different vantage point, there has also been a recent interest in the literature to 12 They are also the only rules within the reverse TAL-family belonging to the families characterized by Moulin (2000) and Chambers (2002) . 13 He also considers the larger family arising from this one when dropping equal treatment of equals, as well as the corresponding dual family. 14 Likewise, the intersection between the dual family and the reverse TAL-family only consists of the con- 
Final remarks
We have studied in this paper a one-parameter family of bankruptcy rules, the reverse TALfamily, which generalizes the reverse Talmud rule and encompasses the constrained equal-awards rule and the constrained equal-losses rule. It is also the counterpart of the so-called TAL-family, previously introduced in the literature, which also generates the Talmud rule. We have explored the behavior of the rules in the family with respect to the standard properties in the literature.
Our findings are summarized in Table 1 .
We observe that all the rules within the family behave extremely well with respect to the basic and monotonicity properties. The family is closed under duality, and one only needs to consider the symmetric parameter in the domain to obtain the dual rule of a given one. The parameter describing the family can actually be interpreted as a progressivity index of the rules within the family. All these aspects are shared with its counterpart family (the TAL-family).
A striking difference between both families (exemplified in Propositions 4 and 5) occurs in the behavior with respect to independence and lower bound properties. Whereas the rules within the TAL-family split in two equal halves to satisfy one of the two properties within each pair of dual properties, only the extreme elements of the reverse TAL-family satisfy them. 16 More generally, and as shown by Hujick et al., (2015) , the baselines first extension operator allows to recover the whole family of CIC rules from the constrained equal-awards rule, provided baselines are generic, and not necessarily a proportion of claims.
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Our results have also allowed us to scrutinize the connections between the reverse TALfamily and some other families of bankruptcy rules that have been recently singled out in the literature.
To conclude, we note that the rules within the reverse TAL-family can be characterized by parametrizing weakenings of exemption and exclusion properties described above (e.g., van den Brink et al., 2013). 17 As such parametrized properties could be consider ad hoc, and thus against the spirit of the axiomatic approach, we dismiss them from the study presented here.
Appendix. Proofs of the results
In what follows, we omit all straightforward steps in the proofs.
Proof of Proposition 2. As all rules within the reverse TAL-family are parametric, we obtain, following Young (1987) , that all rules within the reverse TAL-family satisfy equal treatment of equals, continuity, and consistency. 18 By Lemma 3 in Chambers and Thomson (2002) they also satisfy anonymity.
As for order preservation, let θ ∈ [0, 1] and (N, c, E) ∈ D be given. We distinguish two cases. TAL-family resorting instead to parametrized versions of additive properties, which were not considered here. 18 Obviously, they also satisfy weaker versions of consistency such as those used in Ju and Moreno-Ternero (2017) or Harless (2017) . 19 Note that (1 − c i ) + λ ≥ θc j + (1 − θ)c i .
